Journal Article
Using proprietary data on nonperforming loan (NPL) transactions in China, the authors document that banks conceal NPLs in disposal transactions that are supposed to resolve NPLs. In these transactions, banks provide financing and retain the credit risks and debt collection obligations.
Transaction prices contradict underlying credit risks: Despite being delinquent for 4.5 years, the median NPL package is sold at face value with zero haircut. The majority of NPL packages are resold at a premium to banks’ non–government-owned borrowers, further supporting the concealment view.
Banks under stricter regulation conceal NPLs more and engage in more illicit concealment. NPL-concealing banks increase zombie lending, suggesting that an ineffective resolution exacerbates credit misallocation.
Recognizing the hidden NPLs implies the total NPLs in China is two to three times the reported amount.
