Phone: +65 9446 6721
Financial reporting and disclosure, Corporate investment, Incentive contracting, Performance measurement and evaluation, Industrial, transaction cost, and organizational economics
Managerial accounting, Financial accounting, Corporate governance
Research interests: Financial reporting and disclosure; Corporate investment; Incentive contracting; Performance measurement and evaluation; Industrial, transaction cost, and organizational economics.
Broadly, I study how information affects decision-making. I explore this research theme primarily in the context of how financial information guides managerial decisions, with a particular focus on corporate investment.
In my job market paper, I examine how financial information mitigates demand uncertainty and facilitates investment in R&D and capital expenditures. Customer firms along the supply chain are a relevant source of demand information to supplier firms. However, customers’ incentives to inflate expected demand to ensure sufficient supplies and hold up suppliers’ assets prevent credible communication of demand information and lead to misalignment between true demand and investment. Focusing on the credibility-enhancing role of information disclosure, I demonstrate that customers’ publicly issued management sales forecasts credibly transmit demand estimates that positively adjust suppliers’ investment. This investment effect varies predictably with the credibility of forecasts, bargaining power of suppliers, hold-up possibility of customers, relationship-specificity of assets, relevance of forecasters, and noise in forecasts.
My other research examines the effects of financial information transmission on investment through a mandatory disclosure channel, the effects of peer information on employee performance evaluation, and the effects of performance measurement in incentive contracts on motivating particular managerial decisions.
Please visit my website linked above for more information.