Publications

Journal Article

This paper argues that the effect of network closure on an actor’s performance depends on the predominant role this actor (ego) plays towards her exchange partners (alters) in the relationships affected by that closure.

Using data on informal exchanges among investment bankers, the authors find that network closure in relationships where the banker acts as an “acquirer” of information increases her performance, whereas closure in relationships where the banker acts as a “provider” of information decreases it.

The authors also find that these effects are moderated by the banker’s ability to employ alternative means to induce the cooperation of colleagues in her acquirer role, as well as with the extent to which the banker can benefit from being free from the control of alters in her provider role.

The findings highlight the two sides of the normative control associated with network closure: control benefits ego when she needs to induce alters to behave according to her preferences, but it hurts ego when it forces her to behave according to the preferences of alters.