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Keywords
Price of Anarchy ; Supply Contracts ; Price-only Contracts ; Supply Chain Performance ; Supply Chain Design ; Games-group Decisions ; Inventory Production ; Policies ; Pricing
Journal Article
Perakis G., Roels G. (2007). The Price of Anarchy in Supply Chains: Quantifying the Efficiency of Price-Only Contracts Management Science, 53(8), pp. 1249-1268.
In this paper, the authors quantify the efficiency of decentralized supply chains that use price-only contracts. With a price-only contract, a buyer and a seller agree only on a constant transaction price, without specifying the amount that will be transferred. It is well known that these contracts do not provide incentives to the parties to coordinate their inventory/capacity decisions.