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Ilia Tsetlin
Professor of Decision Sciences
Keywords
DS151007; Multi-Unit Auctions; Sequential Auctions; Uniform-Price Auction; Affiliated Values; Information Revelation
Journal Article
Mezzetti C., Sasa Pekec A., Tsetlin I. (2008). Sequential Vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions Games and Economic Behavior, 62(2), pp. 591-609.
The authors study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. The authors derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids.