Publications

Related Faculty

Ilia Tsetlin

Professor of Decision Sciences

Journal Article

On the Existence of an Increasing Symmetric Equilibrium in (k + 1)-st Price Common Value Auctions

Sasa Pekec A., Tsetlin I. (2006). On the Existence of an Increasing Symmetric Equilibrium in (k + 1)-st Price Common Value Auctions Review of Economic Design, 10(1), pp. 63-71.

On the Existence of an Increasing Symmetric Equilibrium in (k + 1)-st Price Common Value Auctions A classic result of Milgrom (1981) establishes that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) of a signal distribution is a sufficient condition for the existence of symmetric equilibria in common value uniform price (set at the value of the highest rejected bid) multi-item unit-demand auctions.

The authors show that symmetric equilibria could exist even when MLRP is violated and show that a necessary condition is a weakened localized version of MLRP.

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