Emeritus Professor of Political Science
The pre-unification European and foreign policy of the "old" Federal Republic was marked by four principal traits: an emphatically Western orientation, a strong commitment to multilateralism underpinned by close bilateral relations with France and the US, its civilian character, and Euro-centrism. Although it took place in radically different circumstances and under radically different conditions to the first, the second German unification nonetheless gave rise to fears among the political leaders of many other states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe - and among the proponents of some international relations theories - that it would herald sweeping changes in Germany's foreign policy orientation and profoundly destabilise inter-state relations in Europe.The contributions to this volume show that, in the decade following the second unification, there has been more continuity than change in German European and foreign policy. The most important change concerns attitudes and behaviour in respect of the use of military force. Under the pressure of its Western allies and events in the Balkans which have forced it to choose between opposition to war and opposition to genocide, Germany has shed much of its earlier inhibitions concerning the use of military force and become much more like a "normal" big power in Europe.However, because this trend has been explicitly encouraged and welcomed by Germany's allies and partners and because it has taken place exclusively within the multilateral frameworks of NATO and the EU, it does not presage the return of a political "Frankenstein monster" or the revival of the pre-Second World War patterns of European inter-state rivalry. The second German unification will assuredly not turn.