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Creating new market space is something
most companies aspire to, but few really know how to achieve. W.
Chan Kim and Renée
Mauborgne lay out a road map for
firms seeking uncharted territories in their search for profitable growth.
What attracts the wild-eyed attention
of Wall Street, excites the best and brightest to want to work for you,
creates tremendous opportunities for new employment, and wins the mass
of customers? Many things, perhaps. But chief among these is
creating new markets. The profitable growth consequences are enormous.
In studying the business launches of 100 companies, we found that a dollar
invested in businesses that create new markets yields four times the revenue
and a staggering 10 times the profit of a dollar invested in businesses
that improve existing products and services.
In today's hypercompetitive economy
where supply often exceeds demand, competing for share in existing markets
is a cutthroat and marginal strategy. To sustain profitable growth,
companies should go beyond competing in existing industry space to creating
new markets or recreating existing ones. One does not need to look
far for evidence. Think of Wal-Mart in home retailing, Charles Schwab
in brokerage services, SAP in business application software, Home Depot
in home improvement, Swatch in watches, Compaq in PC servers, Borders or
Amazon.com in book retailing, Bloomberg in online financial information,
Enron in energy, Cisco in routers and switches, or Starbucks in coffee.
In less than 40 years, Wal-Mart, for example, has grown into the world's
eighth largest company in revenue and second largest employer with more
than 825,000 people. Or consider shareholder value. Despite
their much smaller sizes, the market value of SAP, for example, exceeds
that of 150-year old Siemens while Schwab's market value recently soared
past that of America's biggest bull, Merrill Lynch.
Consistent with this trend, Procter
& Gamble, one of the US's oldest and most venerable companies, has
realised that only a sustained effort to create new markets and recreate
existing ones will make possible the goal of doubling the 160-year old
company's $35 billion business in the next 10 years. P&G is not
alone. In interviewing over 500 senior managers, we found that creating
new markets was at the top of companies' strategic priorities across the
globe. Yet, few companies have learned to master this challenge.
In our study of 100 randomly chosen companies' new business launches we
found that more than 85% of their so-called new business launches were
no more than incremental improvements on existing businesses. Why?
Simply, companies don't know how
to create new markets. They have been defending and improving existing
businesses for so long that creating sound a bit like sending a hero out
into the night. While tools and analyses abound on how firms can
best position themselves against the competition in existing industry space,
no practical advice exists on how firms can create new market space. Admonitions
to be bold and brave, while inspiring, just don't cut it.
We spent the last decade studying
companies that created new markets or recreated existing ones. Undeniably,
innovation stems from individual talent and creativity. But, more
profoundly, we found six systematic paths to the creation of new markets.
None requires any special vision or foresight about the future. All
come from looking at familiar data with a new perspective that breaks the
conventionally defined boundaries of competition. These paths are invisible
to companies whose strategic focus is on competing within. They can
only be found be looking across: across substitute industries, strategic
groups, buyer groups, complementary product and service offerings, the
functional and emotional appeal of an industry, and even across time.
The following are the six basic
paths identified in our study that opened up new market space.
Look across
substitute industries
Most companies focus on beating
their rivals within their industry. Companies that create new markets
look across substitute industries. The key question they ask is not
what does it take to win in this industry, but what are the key discriminating
factors that lead buyers to trade across substitute industries? They
then build on the distinctive strengths of both substitute industries.
Look at southwest Airlines. It created the short-haul air transport
market by realising that for short-haul flights, surface transportation
- namely the car - was a mean substitute for flying. By zeroing in
on the discriminating factors that lead buyers to trade across these
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WHY LEXUS SUCCEEDED AND
INFINITI NEVER TOOK OFF
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The luxury car market in the US was traditionally
composed of two distinct strategic groups. On the one hand, there
were the European imports of Mercedes, BMW and Jaguar that offered high
engineering performance and design at premium prices. On the other
hand, there were the classic American lines of Cadillac and Lincoln whose
lower prices were accessible to the mass of US luxury car buyers.
Both Toyota's launch of Lexus and Nissan's
launch of Infiniti attempted to establish a credible position in the US
luxury car market. But, while Lexus was an overnight success, whose
market share overtook both Mercedes' and BMW's in less than three years,
Infiniti never took off. Why? While at a glance, both appeared
to follow a similar strategy, a closer look reveals a very different reality.
Lexus focused on combining the distinctive
strengths of both strategic groups in the luxury car market - namely the
lower price point of Cadillac and Lincoln and the high engineering performance
and design of the European imports - to unlock breakthrough value for luxury
car buyers. By combining the key factors that make luxury car buyers
trade up and trade down between these two strategic groups, Lexus rapidly
won share from both groups by offering unprecedented price/performance
value.
In contrast, Infiniti failed to obtain broad
appeal. While its price was relatively low like Lexus's, its quality
distinction was not at par with Lexus's and its esoteric design and advertising
campaign were a big departure from what Americans were accustomed to in
luxury cars. Compared with Lexus whose strategic focus was achieving
an uncompromising combination of the distinctive strengths of both strategic
groups, Infiniti's strategic focus was on differentiating itself from other
luxury cars. Hence, unlike Lexus, Infiniti did not have broad value
appeal to attract demand from both strategic segments. Rather, its
love-it or hate-it design relegated it to a narrow niche, failing to capture
credible share. |
two substitutes, the imagination
for Southwest was born. Southwest offers the best of flying over
driving - speed - and the best of driving over flying - far lower cost
and the ability to leave when you want, that is, frequent departures.
The result: neither the car not other airlines could compete in Southwest's
new markets. Southwest's reward: consistent profitability for the
last 25 years of its operations, a feat accomplished by no other airline.
Consider other examples such as
Intuit in personal financial software which offered the speed and accuracy
of computerised solutions at the low price and ease of use of the pencil,
CarMax which offered the variety of new cars at the low price of used cars,
Home Depot which offered the expertise of professional home contractors
at the low price of hardware stores, and Federal Express and UPS which
delivered mail at nearly the speed of phone.
Look across
strategic groups
Most companies focus on improving
their competitive position within their strategic group or market segment.
To create new market space, companies should not focus on how to outcompete
rivals within their strategic group. They should ask, why do buyers
trade up and trade down between two strategic groups? Think of the
Walkman. Sony combined the key discriminating factors of transistor
radios and the popular boom boxes of the early '80s to create the personal
portable stereo market in the audio industry. It understood that
buyers trade up to boom boxes for their acoustics and "coolness" while
they trade down to transistor radios for their far lower prices and size-weight
convenience. So Sony offered the best of both in its creation of
the Walkman. The Walkman drew share from these two strategic groups
and virtually made them irrelevant. Dozens of new customer types
were also drawn into the market, from joggers to commuters. Other
examples abound. There is Compaq's creation of PC servers between
minicomputers and desktops in the computer industry, Chrysler's creation
of the minivan market between station wagons and big vans, and Toyota's
creation of Lexus between the high end group of Mercedes, BMW, and Jaguar
and the low end group of Cadillac and Lincoln in the luxury car industry
(see box).
Look across
the chain of buyers
In most industries there are
three groups involved in the buying decision - users, purchasers and influencers.
In children's medicine, for example, the users are the children, the purchasers
the parents, and the influencers the doctors. These three buyer groups
often value very different things. Yet, companies in most industries
tend to converge on the same buyer group. By shifting the buyer group
of an industry, companies can discover fundamentally new sources of value
and create new markets. In the copier industry, for example, Xerox,
Kodak, and IBM focused on corporate purchasers who value centrally located
bit machines that can handle large orders and process them fast.
Canon, however, created a whole new market of personal copiers by shifting
to the users - the secretaries. This shift opened its eyes to the
importance of distributed copying with small machines, low prices and smaller
copying needs. Today, Canon sells more copiers than any other company
in the world.
By shifting the focus from IT
managers who are corporate purchasers to users in the financial information
industry, Bloomberg also created breakthrough value by offering built-in
analytics against Reuters and Telerate who focused on IT managers.
In contrast, SAP created the integrated, real-time software market by shifting
the focus from traditional departmental users to corporate IT managers.
Another good example is Philips Lighting. The company created Alto,
the first environmentally friendly light bulb which removed 13,000 kilograms
of mercury from the environment per year, by shifting the focus from traditional
corporate purchasers to influencers, in this case CFOs and public relations
staff who have rising concerns on environmental issues and their attendant
costs.
Look across
complementary products and services
While most companies focus on
maximising the value of the products and services of their industry, new
markets can be found by looking across complementary products and services.
Consider Dyson Vacuum Cleaners. The UK vacuum cleaner industry was
flat, and Hoover and its competitors were increasingly fighting on price,
promotions and marginal improvements of vacuums. Dyson, however,
created new markets, grew the industry and enjoyed higher prices.
While vacuum cleaner bags were considered by the industry as a separate
product purchased and used alongside of the machines, Dyson saw that this
complementary product aggravated people. People found it a nuisance
to buy and change the bags. So Dyson designed its vacuum cleaners
to eliminate the costly and pesky activity of purchasing and changing vacuum
cleaner bags, and with this leapfrogged the competition.
Other examples include:
Borders and Barnes & Noble, both of which created book superstores
that transformed the function of bookstores from selling books to learning
about books and enjoying them by offering complementary products and services
such as knowledgeable staff and café and lounge areas; Virgin
Entertainment Stores, which combined compact discs, videos, computer games,
and stereo and audio equipment to meet buyers' complete entertainment needs;
Compaq's ProLiant which solved configuration and maintenance problems of
servers by incorporating complementary software into servers; or
Zeneca's Salick cancer centres which combined cancer treatments under one
roof so patients did not have to visit one specialised centre after another.
Look across
functional and emotional appeal
Competition in an industry tends
to converge around one of two bases of appeal. Some industries compete
principally on price and functionality, where people buy a product based
largely on utility calculations - their appeal is functional. There
are other industries that compete largely on feelings, glamour and emotion
- their appeal is emotional. Companies can create new markets by
shifting the functional-emotional orientation of their industry.
Consider Swatch. Low-end
watches were long considered a functional item that people bought to keep
track of time. Swatch changed all that by infusing its watches with
fashion, emotion and a powerful message. Before Swatch was introduced,
people usually purchased only one watch. With Swatch, however, repeat
purchases became the standard because people viewed it as a fashion accessory.
Swatch did not compete - it made the competition irrelevant, as did the
Body Shop which stripped away the glamour of the cosmetics industry to
create the first functional line of healthy basic cosmetics and body care
products.
There is a whole raft of new markets
being created in service industries in much the same way. Industries
like insurance, banking and investing have traditionally been very emotionally
oriented, often selling human relationships and client bonding - "the relationship
is the business" - more than products and services. These industries
are being recreated by companies that are stripping away the emotional
ties to create breakthrough price and performance. Direct Line Insurance
in the UK is a good example. Direct Line cut out brokers and regional
branch offices. It instead invested in claim handling and turnaround
time through advanced information technology, and passed on a part of the
tremendous cost savings to customers in the form of lower insurance premiums.
US-based Vanguard in index funds and Charles Schwab in the brokerage industry
are doing the same in the investment industry, creating new market space
by transforming emotional human relationship-oriented businesses into high
performance, low-cost functional businesses.
Look across
time
The last way companies create
new markets is to look across time trends. Every industry is subject
to one or two external trends at any point in time. If a trend meets
three criteria - it decisively impacts an industry, is irreversible, and
is evolving down one clear trajectory - companies can create new markets.
The key question here is, if this trend were taken to its logical extreme,
how would it affect value to buyers? Then work backward toward a
solution. Take Cisco. Cisco saw the decisive and irreversible
trend for high-speed data exchange. Cisco also saw that the world
was hampered by slow data rates and incompatible computer networks that
would only worsen as more and more people went online. Cisco's routers,
switches and other network devices were designed to create a breakthrough
in value for customers, offering fast data exchange in a seamless environment.
Today more than 80% of all traffic on the Internet flows through Cisco's
products, and its margins in this market are in the 60% range. Similarly,
Enron created a national market for gas by assessing the gap between the
market as it stood under regulation-price controls and local gas monopolies
and the market as it was to be with deregulation of the gas industry.
Think also of Amazon.com. Jeff Bezos, Amazon's founder, saw the Internet
emerging and the number of people going online dramatically rising.
The number of users on the Internet doubles roughly every 100 days.
Bezos used this trend by creating the first online bookstore with a compelling
value proposition to buyers. The key here is to understand that successful
creation rarely comes from predicting the trend itself, but arises from
business insights into how the trend will change value to customers.
No matter what the industry, there
is always room to create new market space. The key is to break out
of the conventional boundaries that define how we compete and search systematically
across them. By so doing, companies can find the uncharted territories
that represent a real breakthrough in value. These actions of creating
will allow small companies to become big and big companies to regenerate
themselves. They are and will increasingly be the dominant sources
of wealth creation in this knowledge-driven hypercompetitive economy, whereby
companies, buyers and society all win.
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