Publication The Financial Times 
Date (dd/mm/yy) 06/12/02 
Author(s) W. Chan Kim - Renée Mauborgne - Ludo van der Heyden
Title General Failings


 


 


 

General Failings
 

W. Chan Kim, Renée Mauborgne, and Ludo van der Heyden

Napoleon rose from obscurity to conquer Europe and become the symbol of French glory. But it is his downfall that is more telling when it comes to lessons for modern managers.

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Executives have long sought insight into the foundations of effective leadership by studying great military leaders and their acts. While Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and Henry V reside alongside Sun Tzu and The Art of War in the annals of military history, one name that invariably joins them is Napoleon.

Unlike most of the others, Napoleon had no birthright to help him - no resources or wealth to propel him forward. He rose from the small annexed island of Corsica to become the symbol of French strength and glory. What he had to count on was himself. And against all odds he climbed to the top. This article analyses Napoleon's leadership style - in defeat as well as victory - and draws useful parallels for those at the vanguard of modern business.

Whether revered or despised, two facts are indisputable: Napoleon was a brilliant strategist and a larger-than-life leader. He revolutionised military strategy in two ways.

First, he broke with military tradition and formed the corps d'armée, units of 10,000 to 30,000 men who formed miniature armies of infantry, artillery and cavalry. First seen in his campaign at Lodi and instrumental in the battles of Marengo and Austerlitz, the corps were dispersed in mutually supporting positions led by a general carrying out Napoleon's clear orders, but with the flexibility to respond to battle conditions. Acting under Napoleon's maxim, "march divided, fight united", the corps' flexibility and dynamism allowed them to reconfigure in hundreds of combinations depending on battlefield circumstances.

Second, Napoleon used time - not simply force - as a formidable strategic weapon. From his early campaigns in Italy in 1796 to Waterloo in 1815, he would rapidly move his men into the best position. At the battle of Austerlitz his troops raced 90 miles in 48 hours - overcoming his opponents with speed, surprise and flexibility. As Napoleon said: "I have destroyed the enemy merely by marches."

But strategic genius and strong leadership were not enough to save Napoleon. By 1815 he had been forced from power and shipped off to St. Helena with a handful of servants and a pauper's pension. What went wrong? How could a man with the skills and genius to rise up from nothing and conquer Europe fall so quickly from grace? Why, after such a meteoric rise in the battles of Lodi, Austerlitz and Marengo, did he fail so miserably in Russia and at Waterloo?

He did not change his strategy. Military historians agree that he continued to use corps d'armée and to rely on speed throughout his career. But he did change an important, though often overlooked, dimension of his leadership style. While Napoleon's strategic skills and larger-than-life persona remained constant, his decline was presaged by a shift in the quality of his relationships with his generals and field marshals. And this provides profound lessons for today's corporate leaders.

Early successes

If we look at Napoleon's early battles, his relationship with his men was defined by openness, close interaction and exchange. He used "fair process" in the formulation and execution of his strategies and tactics. Beginning with his first major campaign in 1796 at Lodi - where he led his ill-equipped troops through cannon fire and over a burning bridge to conquer a superior Austrian army - Napoleon would prove a master at getting the most out of his men despite limited resources and no reputation.

Napoleon believed in making the simplest soldier a party to his plans and spelling out what was demanded. He treated soldiers with enormous respect for the importance of their contribution. On the eve of the battle of Austerlitz in 1805, Napoleon famously rode over 30 miles up and down his ranks, tiring out horses and staff while informing his troops of the next day's battle plan. Antoine-Henri Jomini, the Austrian war historian, said it was the first time in history that a leader had revealed his plan to his entire army. Bonaparte knew of  his men's needs and motivation and how critical their commitment was to victory at Austerlitz. Taking his men into his confidence raised their morale, provided them with a clear plan and literally won half the battle before it began.

Napoleon would explain everything to his rank and file, from the purpose of each campaign and its significance to France to why certain tactics were used. The latter is best captured in a foot soldier's comment on Napoleon's use of time against the enemy: "He has found a new way of waging war: he makes use of our legs instead of our bayonets." On the eve of a battle, Napoleon would often sleep on the battleground with his soldiers. He understood the advantages of engaging his officers and liked to explain and discuss his strategic plans with them, seeking their reactions and advice.

He would clearly communicate the rewards of victory to his soldiers: "I will lead you into the most fertile plains on earth. Rich provinces, opulent towns, all shall be at your disposal; there you will find honour, glory and riches." Yet he did not foster false expectations: "Soldiers, do not deceive yourselves," he said. "You have achieved nothing ... there are battles to fight, cities to take, rivers to cross..." And with that his soldiers crossed bridges and braved cannon fire for their leader.

Decline

Napoleon's interactions with his generals after Austerlitz were defined by distrust, infighting, recrimination and a lack of proper process, and his success soon evaporated. By 1807, with his rule stretching from Lisbon to Moscow, Napoleon returned to Paris and secluded himself in a sort of self-imposed exile. He enforced strict court etiquette and kept everyone at arm's length.

Daily chats with generals were eliminated. Instead of using the familiar tu form with his leading soldiers, he now insisted on the formal and distant vous form. The Empereur des Franais, as he now wished to be addressed, awarded exotic titles to some generals while shunning others without giving clear reasons.

Napoleon would no longer deal with his generals directly, communicating orders, promotions, sackings and the like through his newly appointed chief of staff. But at the same time he refused to allow anyone to make the smallest decision without his stamp of approval. Many of his close followers were no longer on speaking terms and most were distrustful of one another. All were wary of their leader.

Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, ignoring the counsel of his generals and chief of staff. He started criticising the frank advice of others where he had sought it out in the past. He failed to set proper expectations of the probable severity of the battle as he had once done. As a result, Napoleon's soldiers threw away a good portion of their supplies while travelling to Russia in order to lighten their loads, not believing that they would need such quantities. Once on the battlefield, Napoleon found that he had created a cadre of generals and marshals who were taciturn and cynical as they discovered circumstances far worse than they had been led to expect. Field marshals fought with one another.

Advances and formations were out of place. Some generals followed one plan, while others followed another. The battle unfolded like the French military proverb: "Order, counter-order, disorder."

Despite the debacle, Napoleon was able to capture Moscow. Yet it was a Pyrrhic victory as only 10,000 soldiers returned out of the 500,000 who set out at the start of the campaign. In defeat, Napoleon was exiled to the island of Elba, courtesy of his once-loyal generals. Less than six months later, the emperor would return to rule France for another 100 days, ending once again in the disaster of insubordination, infighting and poor communication that was Waterloo.

Lessons

Napoleon exercised proper process with his generals and staff from the initial battle at Lodi to the decisive battle at Austerlitz. He exploited the collective wisdom and co-operation of his field marshals and generals, all of whom succeeded alongside their leader. After Austerlitz, however, Napoleon's shift in interaction with his generals led to a steady decrease in their collective wisdom and co-operation. More than that, Napoleon bought their hostility and distrust - and with it his own decline. He showed little respect for the intelligence of his generals during his final battles and no longer took their ideas seriously. Neither did he share the reasoning behind his decisions. In short, he abandoned fair process.

In practical terms, fair process encapsulates three mutually reinforcing principles: engagement, explanation and clarity of expectations.

Engagement means involving people in the decisions that affect them by asking for their input and allowing them to argue the merits of one another's ideas and assumptions. Napoleon's early battles, when he made tireless efforts to make even the simplest soldier a party to his plans, were good examples of engagement at work.

The second principle involves explaining the reasons for decisions to all involved parties. In his early battles, Napoleon took great pains to clearly explain to his men his objectives, tactics and strategies.

Clarity of expectations requires that once a decision is made, the new rules of the game are clearly stated: "There is one condition you must swear to fulfil - to respect the people whom you liberate, to repress the horrible pillaging committed by scoundrels incited by our enemies ... Plunderers will be shot without mercy." So said Napoleon to his troops at the battle of Lodi.

When fair process is exercised in decision-making, individuals are inspired to go beyond the call of duty in sharing their ideas and voluntarily co-operating. But when fair process is violated, co-operation and the sharing of knowledge suffer and people  exercise retributive justice to make amends for the improper treatment they receive. This can include shirking, sabotaging efforts and withholding co-operation. And, as Napoleon painfully learned, it also includes desertion by one's own troops.

What makes fair process decisive is that it addresses the basic human need to feel valued. It shows respect for people's intellectual and emotional worth. When treated as intelligent contributors, people are more willing to share their knowledge. Inspired to impress and confirm that expectation of intellectual worth, they actively suggest ideas and share their thoughts.

Similarly, when people are treated with emotional recognition they feel emotionally tied and inspired to give their all. In the case of Napoleon, when his generals and staff felt recognised for their intellectual and emotional worth, they demonstrated a willingness to act out the new role demanded of them, to co-operate with others and to give their all. In the latter battles of his career, Napoleon destroyed the bonds he had formed with his men by refusing to recognise their worth.

Why did Napoleon's relationship with his subordinates change? When he began his career, he had no resources, reputation or birthright to lead. In their absence, he turned to the only resource he had at his disposal to ensure his success - his troops and his generals. When they were the sum of his resources, his dependence on them and recognition of their importance both intellectually and emotionally was clear.

Consciously or subconsciously, this drove him to pay the highest respect to his troops and tirelessly exercise fair process. But once his reputation was secure, his title of emperor established and resources abundant, he shunned the original source of his strength and relied on money, title and power to deliver results. He overlooked the fact that his success originated from, and could only be supported by, his people.
 
In our decade-long research into leadership, we found that a critical but frequently forgotten dimension is the process by which a leader interacts with his or her people to make decisions. Our systematic research shows the causal relationship between procedural fairness and the quality and execution of strategic decisions in corporations. Fair process may have been largely ignored in leadership, but we found that this dimension can make or break a leader.

For business managers the lessons of Napoleon raise several pertinent questions about the way they treat staff. Is there fair process in interactions with management teams? Do managers feel that their intellectual and emotional worth are recognised and respected? Or do they feel frustrated as Napoleon's generals and field marshals did in the final campaigns of his career?

The art of war

Alexander the Great built an empire stretching from Greece to India before he died at the age of 33. The Roman historian Plutarch put his success down to charisma and acts of personal bravery. Tutored by the Greek philosopher Aristotle, he set himself a specific goal and worked out a strategy to achieve it.

Julius Caesar had a strong bond with his army. His reputation stems largely from his persistence, his analysis of terrain and logistics, and his ability to anticipate others' moves and react to the unexpected.

Genghis Khan, leader of the Mongolian people, founded an empire that stretched from northern China to the Black Sea. His success has been attributed to superior strategy, a highly mobile cavalry, endurance, discipline and a co-ordinated manner of fighting.

Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, was a hands-on leader, dealing personally with many aspects of battle - from supply problems to negotiations with Napoleon. He was also acknowledged as a leader who took his troops' welfare seriously, and had strict rules about dealing with the people he conquered.

Erwin Rommel, the German tank commander, faced limited resources and unreliable supply lines in north Africa's deserts during the second world war. Often separated from his officers by hundreds of miles, he developed a highly efficient system of communication, while encouraging his men to take great initiative.

Further reading

Kim W.C. and Mauborgne, R. (2003) "Fair process: managing in the knowledge economy", Harvard Business Review, January.
Kim W.C. and Mauborgne, R. (1998) "Procedural justice, strategic decision making, and the knowledge economy", Strategic Management Journal, April.
Chandler, D.G. (1973) Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier, New York: Scribner.    
Cronin, V. (1990) Napoleon, New York: HarperCollins.
Chandler, D.G. (1997) The Military Maxims of Napoleon, New York: Macmillan

 


 

W. Chan Kim is The Boston Consulting Group Bruce D. Henderson Chair Professor of International Management at INSEAD, France.

Renée Mauborgne is The INSEAD Distinguished Fellow and a professor of strategy and management at INSEAD, and a Fellow of the World Economic Forum. 

Ludo van der Heyden is the Solvay Professor for Technological Innovation and the Wendel/CGIP Professor for the Large Family Business at INSEAD.

 

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